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Concerns about transfusion-transmitted infectious diseases (TTIDs) have
been raised since the beginning of routine blood administration for
therapeutic purposes in the late 1930s. Syphilis was the first transmissible
disease for which prospective blood donor testing was implemented in the
1950s [1]. Although infectious post-transfusion hepatitis (PTH) was
recognized and described in the early 1940s [2], it was believed to be
a transient and generally minor infectious complication, and interventions
to reduce PTH did not occur until the discovery of hepatitis B virus and
hepatitis C virus decades later. Awareness of infectious disease transmission
by transfusion did not slow the dramatic increase in administration of
donated blood from the 1950s through 1970s, which paralleled the
expansion of medical care and procedural capability during that period.
Given the widespread use of transfusions by the early 1980s, the
realization that the then newly-discovered fatal acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome could be transmitted by transfusion came as a shock to
transfusion medicine specialists and the public. Since then, efforts to protect
the blood supply from the viruses causing AIDS (HIV) and PTH have
resulted in an unparalleled focus of resources and attention on the
characterization, detection, and prevention of TTIDs. This commitment
has paid off, and blood safety is now at historically unprecedented levels, at
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and concerns among health professionals about disease transmission by
transfusion persist, and these concerns have caused a redirection of
attention from the classical TTIDs to ‘‘emerging infections.’’ For the
purposes of this review, the authors apply this term broadly to include (1)
recently discovered entities, such as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease and
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), for which transmission by
transfusion is unproved; (2) longer-known pathogens, such as West Nile
virus, that are newly recognized as agents causing TTIDs, and (3) conditions
such as bacterial contamination and malaria that have been a concern since
the beginning of transfusion therapy but are emerging as more pressing
concerns now that classical TTIDs have been nearly eliminated. The authors
follow a taxonomic order in reviewing the various pathogens. The article
closes with a brief reflection on the challenges posed by new and emerging
pathogens and an outline of the general approaches that are pursued to
protect the blood supply.
Table 1
Risk of transfusion-transmitted diseases in the United States
Pathogenic agent Average estimated risk per unit
Hepatitis A Unknown; presumably\1:1 million
Hepatitis B 1:205,000a
Hepatitis C 1:1,935,000b
Human immunodeficiency virus-1 1:2,135,000b
Human T-lymphotropic virus-I, II 1:2,993,000
Cytomegalovirus (CMV) Infrequent with leukocyte-reduced
components
Parvovirus B19 Unknown; presumably\1:1 million
West Nile and other arboviruses Regional and seasonal risk; observed
incidence of transmissions during 2003
season after implementation of pooled
NAT approximately 1:1 million recipients
Bacterial contamination
associated with symptomatic sepsis
1:5 million per red blood cell unitc
1:100,000 per apheresis or pooled
platelet unitc
Malaria 1:4,000,000
Babesia \1:1 million
Chagas’ disease Unknown; presumably\1:1 million
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD),
variant CJD
Single probable case reported in
United Kindom
Abbreviations: HBV, hepatitis B virus; HCV, hepatitis C virus; NAT, nucleic acid testing.
a Estimates for HBV reflect risk projections prior to implementation of blood donor
screening with NAT [3].
b Estimates for HIV, HCV indicate risk projections following implementation of NAT for
these agents in 1999 [3].
c Risk estimate reflects the experience of a 2-year United States national study from
1998–2000, prior to implementation of standards to detect and limit bacterial contamination.
Because of likely underreporting, true risks were probably higher [58].
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Hepatitis B to D viruses
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV), members of the
Hepadna and Flavivirus families, respectively, are two of the classically
known transfusion-transmitted viruses (TTVs) and are therefore not
considered further in this article. Detailed information can be found in
recent reviews [5,6]. Hepatitis D, originally called the delta agent, is
a defective RNA-containing passenger virus that requires HBV to act as
a ‘‘helper’’ for assembly of envelope proteins. Screening for HBV prevents
transfusion-associated hepatitis D cases by identifying donors who are co-
infected with hepatitis B and D.
Hepatitis A and E viruses
These viruses, which are primarily transmitted via the fecal-oral route,
cause frequent epidemics of acute hepatitis in developing countries, with
occasional focal outbreaks in the United States and other developed
countries. Viremic periods are generally brief, although, at least in the case
of hepatitis A virus (HAV), viremia may be present up to 30 days before
onset of symptoms, which is longer than previously realized [7]. Because
prolonged carrier states have not been described and parenteral trans-
mission is rare, neither HAV nor hepatitis E virus (HEV) is considered
a blood-borne pathogen in the strict sense. Animal inoculation studies and
one recent report in humans have documented transmission of HEV by
transfusion of fresh components, although the risk is undoubtedly very
small given the rarity of reports and the high prevalence of this infection in
many developing countries [7–9]. On the other hand, cases of transfusion-
transmitted HAV have been well documented and are estimated to occur at
a rate of less than approximately 1 per million units transfused [6,10,11]. A
greater concern is contamination of plasma derivatives, such as albumin,
gamma globulin preparations, and clotting factor concentrates, by HAV.
Because of the pooling of thousands of plasma donations in the manufac-
ture of plasma derivatives and the relative resistance of HAV to in-
activation, even rare instances of donor viremia can lead to widespread
contamination of these products. Consequently, HAV has caused several
outbreaks of clinical disease from contaminated coagulation factor prepa-
rations [12,13]. Albumin, plasma protein fractions, and immune globulin
preparations, however, have not been implicated in HAV transmission. The
manufacturing process for these products partitions virus into different
plasma fractions, and the presence of anti-HAV in immune globulin
preparations can be expected to protect against residual infectious HAV,
should it enter this product [14]. Newer viral inactivation methods and
nucleic acid testing (NAT) on pooled plasma samples promise further
protection from HAV transmission by means of plasma products. Because
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blood donors using NAT technology has not been recommended.
Non–A to E hepatitis
The vast majority of post-transfusion hepatitis cases can be attributed to
known A to E hepatitis viruses, mostly HBV and HCV. Occasional cases,
however, appear to be caused by as yet undiscovered agents, and several
novel candidate viruses have been identified. Hepatitis G virus (GBV-C),
a member of the Flaviviridae family, is transmitted predominantly by the
parenteral route. Infection occurs frequently among those infected with
HCV and HIV. Approximately 2% of blood donors and 15% to 20% of
injection–drug users in the United States have detectable GBV-C RNA.
Additional persons have antibodies against E2 envelopes protein in the
absence of GBV-C RNA, suggesting viral clearance. Epidemiologic studies
have shown no association of GBV-C infection with liver disease [15,16], but
have demonstrated a delay in disease progression for those co-infected with
HIV [17]—an intriguing observation that is not yet fully understood.
The TT virus, a nonenveloped DNA virus discovered in 1997, has a 1%
to 2% prevalence in North America. It is transmitted by transfusion, but its
presence has not yet been correlated with liver disease. Another entity, the
SEN virus (SENV), was identified while investigating patients for possible
TT virus agents. It is a member of the Circovirus family, characterized by
circular DNA contained in a nonenveloped, round nucleocapsid. Despite an
initial report of two patients with transfusion-associated non–A to E
hepatitis harboring SENV variants (SENV-D and SENV-H), subsequent
reports have failed to link SENV with clinical hepatitis [18,19].
To date, neither GBV-C, the TT virus, nor SENV has borne out initial
indications that they represented clinically significant viruses; hence donor
screening has not been implemented. It is expected that identification of new
putative hepatitis viruses will continue, perhaps closing the perceived gap in
the list of known causative agents of infectious hepatitis.
Retroviruses
Since the first reports of HIV transmission by transfusion appeared in the
early 1980s, this retrovirus (so named after reverse transcriptase, the enzyme
that allows retroviruses to transcribe viral RNA into DNA that is inserted in
the host genome) has become the best known TTV and has had a dramatic
impact on public perceptions of blood safety. Owing to a series of
incrementally effective preventive measures, the risk of HIV-transfusion–
transmitted infection has declined remarkably in high-income countries and
can now only be estimated through mathematical modeling [4,20]. The most
recent estimate projects a residual risk of approximately 1 in 1.9 million
transfusions [3]. Blood donor screening with currently available antibody
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income nations, many of which are burdened with appallingly high
prevalence of HIV, lack the resources and infrastructure to screen their
blood supply consistently for contamination with HIV and other TTVs.
Because rates of HIV infection are still reaching new populations,
particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia, HIV qualifies as an emerging
virus in parts of the world. Another cause of concern is the appearance of
new subtypes and the overall increasing genetic diversity of HIV [21]. Blood
donor screening tests were initially developed and validated to detect the
main group (group M), subtype B HIV-1 virus: a reflection of the
predominance of this HIV strain in North America and Europe. Worldwide,
however, non–subtype B strains of HIV-1 group M predominate. In the
past, existing antibody assays did not perform as well with non–subtype B
viral strains [22], causing concern that infections with such strains could be
missed. Ongoing surveillance studies monitor the emergence of new HIV
variants [23] and the effectiveness of routine HIV test kits in detecting these
viruses.
Human T-lymphotropic virus I and II (HTLV-I and -II) are closely
related retroviruses in the oncovirinae group that were identified as TTVs
shortly after the discovery of HIV [24]. As with HIV, the risk of HTLV
transmission by transfusion has plummeted in the United States since the late
1980s when blood donor screening began [3]. As a result, these viruses are
currently not considered a rising threat from a transfusion-safety perspective.
Human herpes viruses
Human herpes viruses (HHV) are enveloped, structurally complex
double-stranded DNA viruses that cause common infectious diseases,
usually associated with life-long carrier states and the possibility of
recurrent reactivation infections. They are classified in three subfamilies:
alpha-, beta-, and gamma-Herpesvirinae. Of these, only the beta herpes
virus cytomegalovirus (CMV or HHV-5) figures prominently in current
transfusion practice. Use of blood products from CMV seronegative donors
for patients at high risk of serious CMV disease (eg, stem cell transplant
recipients) has been the major strategy for prevention of CMV transfusion
complications over the past 4 decades. Since CMV transmission by trans-
fusion generally requires transfer of infected leukocytes, the overall risk of
CMV transmission can be expected to have declined significantly since the
transition toward an all–leukocyte-reduced blood supply in high-income
nations in recent years [25]. Although Epstein Barr virus (EBV) also can be
transmitted by transfusion, EBV is ubiquitous in both donors and
recipients, and transfusion acquisition is generally asymptomatic or
associated with a benign course.
Among the HHVs, only HHV-8, a gamma herpes virus linked to
Kaposi’s sarcoma, body-cavity–based lymphoma, and Castleman’s disease,
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lymphocytes and monocyte-macrophages and has been shown to be trans-
mitted by transplantation. Definitive evidence of transmission by trans-
fusion is lacking, however. The seroprevalence of HHV-8 among United
States blood donors has been reported in regional studies to be as high as
20% to 25% [26]. However, a recent multicenter study of 1000 donors from
five representative United States regions, involving seven state-of-the-art
assays, found a seroprevalence of only 3% to 3.5% and no evidence of
donor viremia [27]. These findings are in agreement with epidemiologic
studies that suggest that sexual contact is the preferred route of HHV-8
transmission, whereas blood-borne transmission is an unlikely event [28,29].
A greater potential for HHV-8 transmission by transfusion may exist in sub-
Saharan Africa, where HHV-8 DNA was reported in approximately 20% of
investigated blood donors, and fresh, nonleukoreduced transfusions are
common practice [30,31].
Parvovirus B19
Parvovirus B19, a nonenveloped DNA virus, has been known to be
transmitted by transfusion for decades. It has recently attracted more
attention because of the realizations that viremia is relatively common in
blood donors, that inactivation of the virus is not easy and reliable, and that
recipients of blood and blood products include patient populations that are
increasingly vulnerable to infection and its sequelae. The virus causes an
exanthematic illness called fifth disease in infants and a generally asymp-
tomatic acute infection in adults [32]. Most infections occur in those 6 to 15
years of age, such that approximately 50% of adults are seropositive for
parvovirus B19 antibodies. The virus is classified as an erythrovirus,
reflecting its tropism for erythroid progenitor cells through its receptor,
the erythrocyte P antigen [33]. The P antigen is expressed on megakar-
yocytes, endothelium, placenta, fetal liver, and fetal heart cells, but
erythroid precursor cells are the most susceptible. Following infection,
neutralizing antibodies appear. Patients with sickle cell anemia, thalassemia,
and other conditions associated with shortened red cell survival are at risk
for developing acute aplastic or hypoplastic anemia following infection.
Others who are at risk for aplasia following parvovirus infection include
immunodeficient patients, HIV-infected patients, solid organ transplant
recipients, and children with malignancies. Immunocompromised patients
may develop severe chronic anemia due to persistent parvovirus infection.
Acute parvovirus infection during pregnancy may result in fetal loss,
neurologic abnormalities, and congenital infection [34]. Red blood cell
aplasia and chronic anemia due to parvovirus infection often respond to
infusion with immune globulin preparations [35].
Parvovirus can be expected to be present in 1 in 20,000 to 50,000 blood
donors, with significantly higher incidence during epidemic periods.
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cipient, or both, and only occasional transmissions of parvovirus due to
single-donor components have been reported [35]. On the other hand,
transmission from plasma-derived products has been a significant concern,
because of the near ubiquity of the virus in the large plasma pools that are
the source material for plasma products and its resistance to common
inactivation methods. Although the presence of neutralizing antibodies in
the plasma pool provides some protection, this does not guarantee recipients
will not be infected [36]. Prospective studies in previously untreated
hemophilic patients who received virus-attenuated factor concentrates dem-
onstrated a persistent 40% risk of parvovirus infection [37]. Fortunately,
these patients in general do not suffer serious or long-term hematologic
sequelae, regardless of HIV serostatus [37]. Parvovirus DNA has also been
detected in albumin preparations, and earlier studies suggested that the
routine 10-hour pasteurization step at 60(C in the manufacturing process
may not be effective in inactivating the virus. However, a more recent study
using a cell culture system for human parvovirus indicates that the virus is
rapidly destroyed by heating, consistent with the good safety record of
albumin with regard to parvovirus transmission [38]. Recently implemented
NAT screening of source plasma to exclude high-level viremic donations
from use in manufacturing promises to reduce the risk of parvovirus
infection from these products [39]. Further elimination of the virus from
manufactured plasma products may be enabled by development of an
effective nanofiltration method [40].
New and emerging viruses
Several recent, highly publicized outbreaks of communicable diseases in
humans, including SARS [41], monkey pox infection [42], and avian
influenza A [43], were caused by viruses usually found in animals,
highlighting the problem of an apparent increase in species-to-species
transmission of pathogenic viruses. This phenomenon, termed zoonosis,
was also responsible for the epidemics of HIV (derived from simian
immunodeficiency viruses) and HTLV (derived from simian T-lymphotropic
viruses). Zoonotic transmissions and epidemics can be expected to continue
and perhaps increase in the future, because of such factors as shrinking
natural habitats, increased human activities around wildlife, and more
frequent international travel, trade, and migration. When humans are
exposed to new viruses in this way, the lack of immunity in the population
has the potential to cause devastating pandemics such as the past global
outbreaks of influenza and the ongoing AIDS pandemic. With the exception
of West Nile virus (discussed in detail later in this article), none of the
viruses that may be considered emerging human pathogens are blood-borne
organisms in the classical sense, and they are therefore not likely to be
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documented in SARS [44], prompting temporary prophylactic deferral of
blood donors at risk for the disease. SARS is probably not unusual in this
respect; it can be assumed that periods of asymptomatic viremia also occur
in other zoonotic infections that have caused disease outbreaks in humans.
Another unknown but potential threat is that zoonotic viruses might acquire
new mutations as they adapt to the human host that could change their
mode of transmission and alter other properties, increasing transmissibility
and pathogenicity in general [45].
A recent object of concern with regard to emerging viral infections and
transfusions is well known human viruses that cause common communi-
cable diseases, such as enteroviruses. Although these may cause symp-
tomatic infection and mild self-limited disease in healthy adults, they can
cause severe symptoms in vulnerable populations such as infants, immu-
nosuppressed patients, and the elderly. Researchers in Scotland have
identified seasonally fluctuating viremia involving enterovirus species in
approximately 1 in 4000 Scottish blood donors (Fig. 1) [46]. The signi-
ficance of this finding for disease transmission and the need for routine
donor screening and other preventive measures to protect the blood
supply have not yet been established, but are obvious areas for further
investigation.
Fig. 1. A comparison of the monthly observed frequency of enterovirus RNA detection in
Scottish blood donors (bars) during 1999–2001 with clinical isolation of non-polio–enter-
oviruses (solid squares) reported to the Scottish Center for Infection and Environmental Health
for the same time period. (FromWelch J, Maclaran K, Jordan T, Simmonds P. Frequency, viral
loads, and serotype identification of enterovirus infections in Scottish blood donors.
Transfusion 2003;43(8):1063; with permission.)
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West Nile virus (WNV) is a single-stranded RNA virus of the Flavivirus
family and a member of the Japanese encephalitis virus serocomplex that
includes Japanese encephalitis virus and St. Louis encephalitis virus [47].
Viruses in this complex are arthropod-borne or arboviruses (ie, transmitted
by mosquitoes and other arthropod vectors) with the potential to cause
meningoencephalitis. WNV was first isolated in 1937 in the West Nile
District of Northern Uganda and derives its name from that region. Over
the next several decades its geographic range was found to extend over
eastern and southern Europe, Africa, the Middle East (including Israel),
Russia, and western and southern Asia (especially India). The natural life
cycle of the virus includes certain species of female mosquitoes as vectors,
with birds serving as the primary vertebrate hosts that replicate the virus to
high titer (amplifying hosts). Humans and other mammals (particularly
horses) are incidental hosts, with transmission occurring through bites of
infected mosquitoes. Peak transmission occurs in the late summer and
early fall.
There were no cases of WNV infection in North America (or the entire
Western Hemisphere) before a WNV outbreak in New York City in summer
1999 [48]. The virus became dormant during the winter months and re-
emerged to cause a small number of human cases during the summers of
2000 and 2001. However, a much larger epidemic occurred in the United
States in 2002, with significant geographic spread including westward
migration (Fig. 2). Over 4000 cases and 284 deaths were reported in 40
states [49].
Transmission of WNV by transfusion was considered biologically
plausible given that asymptomatic WNV infection is associated with a brief,
up to 2-week period of viremia [50]. In late August 2002, a case of WNV
transmission from an organ donor to four recipients was documented, and
evidence was obtained indicating that the organ donor was likely infected by
one of over 60 transfusions given before organ harvest [50,51]. Over the next
several months intensive investigations confirmed 23 cases of transfusion-
transmitted WNV infection in the United States in the summer and fall of
2002. Twelve of these transfusion recipients developed meningoencephalitis
and several died. All types of blood components (red blood cells, platelets,
and fresh frozen plasma) transmitted infection. The severity of infection
appeared to be to a large degree dependent on the recipient, with more
severe outcomes seen in immunocompromised patients.
The Food and Drug Administration took a number of actions to lower
the risk of transfusion transmission [50]. Policies for management of donors
with proved or suspected WNV infection were implemented, along with
policies for product quarantine/retrieval and notification of transfusion
recipients. In December 2002, a recommendation was made to voluntarily
withdraw from hospital and blood center inventories selected frozen
Fig. 2. (A) Geographic distribution of West Nile virus infections, including human cases
(checkered pattern) from 1999–2001. This period marks the beginning of the current United
States epidemic that flares and spreads during the summer months, coinciding with the
mosquito season. (B) The reach of the epidemic in 2003, with the number of human cases shown
for each involved state. A total of 9858 cases and 262 WNV-related deaths were reported to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2003, approximately twice as many cases as in
2002 but with a slightly lower number of deaths (284 in 2002). The majority (85%) of viremic
blood donations were observed in the nine central-western states, coinciding with the highest
numbers of reported cases. (From CDC, Division of Vector-Borne Infections Diseases,
West Nile Virus, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&control03Maps.htm. Last
accessed: June 17, 2004.)
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areas of the country that had documented mosquito-borne transmission of
WNV to humans.
Blood donor screening with NAT assays was implemented with un-
precedented speed and was in place throughout the United States in early
summer 2003, just in time for the year’s main mosquito season. From late
June to December 2003, approximately 6 million donations were screened
for WNV, yielding over 800 (0.01%) presumptive viremic donations based
on repeated positive NAT results on donor plasma samples (Fig. 3). The
majority of WNV-positive blood donations originated in central western
areas of the United States, consistent with the predicted westward migration
of the outbreak.
As in HIV and HCV blood donation screening, samples were tested for
logistical reasons in minipools of 16 to 24 (MP-NAT), a process that
lowered the sensitivity of the WNV NAT assay and potentially allowed for
breakthrough transmissions by units with low-level viremia. Overall, six
cases of confirmed or probable transfusion-transmitted WNV were docu-
mented in 2003 [52]. The median age of affected recipients was 63 (range 13
to 82); four had WNV encephalitis, one had West Nile fever, and one
critically ill patient did not have discernible WNV-compatible illness despite
confirmed WNV infection. Each had received multiple blood components,
including single infectious units collected during the summer months of
Fig. 3. The number (total N¼ 818) of United States blood donors with presumed viremic WNV
infection by week of donation from June to December 2003. (From Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.Update:WestNile virus screening of blood donations and transfusion-associated
transmission—United States, 2003. MMWRMorb Mortal Wkly Rep 2004;53(13):282.)
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screening but tested positive upon retrospective testing on an archived
undiluted sample, demonstrating the capability of WNV to be transmitted
by transfusion at very low levels (estimated median viremia from four of the
six transmission cases was 0.11 plaque-forming units/mL). None of the
donors reported WNV illness before or after donation. The documentation
of these breakthrough infections has led to implementation of strategies for
conversion from MP-NAT to single donation NAT in collection regions
with high WNV activity, as evidenced by clinical case reporting or MP-NAT
yield rates.
Another member of the Flaviviridae family, also transmitted to humans
by the bite of an infected mosquito, is the dengue fever virus [53]. The
clinical syndrome most often caused by dengue is an acute flu-like illness;
meningoencephalitis is rare. The rarer, more severe complications of dengue
are thought to require an initial infection with one strain of the virus and
a second infection with a different strain. Dengue is widespread in tropical
regions of the world, including Central and South America and the
Caribbean islands, and the number of cases in these regions has increased
over the last several decades. Cases of dengue fever are rare in the United
States and Canada, and there is no evidence of local mosquito-borne
transmission in this part of the continent.
To date, no transfusion-transmitted cases of dengue have been reported
anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, transfusion transmission of arbovi-
ruses other than WNV may be expected, since there is an acute viremia of
a few days to perhaps 2 weeks following exposure. In the United States these
arboviruses would most likely be eastern equine encephalitis, western equine
encephalitis, St. Louis encephalitis, and La Crosse encephalitis [53].
Bacterial contamination
Bacterial contamination of blood components, which may result in septic
reactions, even death, in transfusion recipients, has been a well-recognized
threat since the early days of the procedure [54]. There is no indication that
bacterial contamination per se is on the rise, but continual increase in the
use of platelets, the blood component associated with the vast majority of
septic reactions, has resulted in an overall increase in and awareness of
bacteria-induced transfusion reactions. Indeed, bacterial sepsis is currently
the number one cause of acute transfusion-related mortality linked to an
infectious agent. In addition, the declining risk of HIV and hepatitis
transmission has played a role in focusing attention on bacterial contam-
ination as a re-emerging infectious risk of transfusion.
As stated, the risk of septic reactions, classically characterized by fever,
chills, and rigors that potentially progress to septic shock, is far greater with
platelets than with red blood cells. The primary reason is the required room-
809E.W. Fiebig, M.P. Busch / Clin Lab Med 24 (2004) 797–823temperature storage of platelets, a procedure that, despite restriction of
storage length to 5 days, provides far better growth potential for bacteria
than 42-day refrigerated red blood cell storage. Notably, autologous red cell
transfusion has also been associated with a higher risk of septic reactions
than has administration of allogeneic red cells [55], a finding readily
explained by the generally poorer health of autologous donors, higher rates
of unrecognized bacteremia, and application of less stringent donor
selection criteria in autologous donation [56].
The prevalence of bacterial contamination in allogeneic blood compo-
nents, detectable by culture of components, has been estimated at
approximately 1 in 3000 for platelets and 1 in 30,000 for red cells [57]. In
a recent 2-year national study in the United States, serious septic reactions
were reported in approximately 1 in 100,000 platelet transfusions and 1 in 5
million red cell unit transfusions [58]. The rates for fatal reactions associated
with platelet and red cell transfusions were 1 in 500,000 and 1 in 10 million,
respectively. Owing to lack of clinical awareness and reporting, these figures
undoubtedly represent a low estimate; significantly higher rates have been
documented by surveillance studies in single institutions [54].
Microorganisms isolated from contaminated red cell units include
Staphylococcus epidermidis, Serratia liquefaciens, Pseudomonas species,
and Yersinia enterocolitica. The last of these, a gram-negative endotoxin-
producing organism, is remarkable for its preference for growth at colder
temperatures in iron-enriched environments. Gram-positive skin sapro-
phytes account for most of the organisms contaminating platelet concen-
trates, with the remaining contaminations attributed to gram-negative
organisms associated with occult bacteremia. Most fatal reactions are due
to endotoxin reactions associated with gram-negative bacteria. Platelet
concentrates contaminated with Bacillus species, Escherichia coli, Klebsiella
species, Staphylococcus aureus, S epidermidis, Serratia marcescens, and
Streptococcus species account for 85% of fatal reactions [59]. Moreover,
although the bacterial content in a contaminated component at the time of
collection may be exceedingly small, bacteria propagate during component
storage (unlike viruses), resulting in a many log increase in concentration
and release of endotoxin and other toxic metabolites. The minimum
bacterial doses in platelet concentrates needed to produce morbidity or
mortality are not known precisely, although bacterial concentrations of 108
colony-forming units per mL have consistently resulted in fatalities [60].
Time-honored approaches to preventing bacterial contamination include
selection of healthy blood donors and adherence to strict aseptic techniques
at likely entry points of bacteria, such as blood donation, component
preparation, transport, storage, and infusion. In a determined effort to
further reduce bacterial contamination and septic transfusion reactions, US
Blood Centers and Transfusion Services were expected to implement sys-
tems that detect and limit bacterial contamination in platelets in early 2004
[61]. Most detection systems require sterile sampling of platelet components
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able levels). Approximately 4-mL to 10-mL samples of the platelet compo-
nent are inoculated into automated culture systems where bacteria are
detected through evidence of oxygen consumption or carbon dioxide genera-
tion in enriched growth media. Though generally successful, these methods
have natural limitations due to slow growth rates and the lack of easily
detectable metabolic products in some pathogenic bacteria. Several non–
culture bacterial detection systems have also been described [54]. Finally,
more effective prevention of bacterial contamination can be achieved by the
use of newer skin disinfection solutions during donor phlebotomy and
diversion of the first 15 mL of collected blood (which are then used for
blood typing and infectious disease screening). These methods alone or in
combination may reduce the bacterial load in skin fragments trapped in the
phlebotomy needle that subsequently enter blood storage containers [62,63].
The outlined measures aimed at reducing bacterial contamination of
blood components are likely to have a significant positive impact on the
number of septic transfusion reactions. Concerns are being raised, however,
about unwelcome consequences of these efforts. These consequences could
include significant increases in costs and more frequent platelet shortages
due to higher discard rates and shorter windows during which platelets are
available for distribution. It is to be hoped that evidence of lower bacterial
contamination rates attributable to the new safeguards will permit return to
a 7-day platelet storage period, which was standard before rising rates of
septic reactions in the 1980s forced implementation of the current 5-day
storage period. A longer distribution period for platelets could at least
partially offset financial losses and raise the availability of this essential
blood component [64].
Tick-borne bacterial infections
Ticks are an increasingly recognized vector of bacterial zoonoses;
examples of infections they transmit to humans include Lyme disease,
ehrlichioses, and rickettsioses [65]. Reports of tick-borne diseases, which
also include viral and parasitic infections (among them babesiosis, which is
discussed under parasites), have risen sharply in the United States in recent
years [66,67]. This increase may be in part due to newly instituted reporting
requirements of tick-borne infections to state health agencies, but one may
speculate that there is also a true increase caused by factors such as the
widening geographic range of tick vectors in the United States, the spread of
residential areas to tick habitats, and the increasing popularity of outdoor
sports and leisure activities that bring humans in contact with the vector.
Lyme disease, caused by the spirochete Borrelia burgdorferi, is the most
common vector-borne illness in the United States, with more than 23,000
infections in 2002 [68]. The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from
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probably occurs postinfection and may be present in asymptomatic persons.
Nonetheless, no clinical or serologic evidence of transfusion-transmitted
Lyme disease was demonstrated in cardiothoracic surgery patients receiving
blood collected in New England during the peak deer tick season [69], and to
date there have been no confirmed reports of transfusion-acquired Lyme
disease [67].
Other tick-borne pathogens that may be transmitted by transfusion
include Rickettsia rickettsii, the causative organism of Rocky Mountain
spotted fever (RMSF), and Anaplasma phagocytophilum (formerly Ehrlichia
species), the agent responsible for human granulocytic ehrlichiosis (HGE),
an acute febrile illness similar to RMSF but without the characteristic
petechial rash. Single cases of transfusion-transmitted RMSF and HGE
were reported in the late 1970s and 1990s, respectively [67]. In both cases the
transmitting blood units had not been leukocyte-reduced. Because the
causative agents are obligatory intracellular bacteria, recent widespread
adoption of leukocyte reduction of cellular blood components can be
expected to lower the risk of transfusion transmission of these organisms
[70].
Parasites
A variety of parasitic infections are transmissible by transfusion, most
commonly malaria, Chagas’ disease, and babesiosis, which are discussed in
detail in this section. Rare reports of human transfusion-transmitted
trypanosomiasis (African Sleep sickness), leishmaniasis, toxoplasmosis,
and microfilariasis have also been reported, primarily in areas endemic for
these organisms [71,72]. In accordance with the natural geographic
distribution of the major blood-borne parasites—with the exception of
babesiosis, which is found in areas with temperate climates—transfusion-
transmitted parasitic infections are primarily a concern of tropical and
subtropical countries, where a significant proportion of prospective blood
donors are afflicted. The problem is compounded by the lack of resources
and infrastructure in many of these nations, which interferes with effective
preventive measures [73]. However, increasing international travel, tourism,
and human migration from countries where transfusion-transmissible
parasitic infections are endemic raise concern about an increase in trans-
fusion-transmitted parasitic disease in areas that are not naturally affected.
Malaria
In the United States, malaria occurs in travelers, military personnel, and
immigrants from endemic countries. Occasional cases result from mosquito
transmission, blood transfusion, or organ transplantation. Approximately
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States, with a reported incidence of 0 to 0.2 cases per million units
transfused during the 5-year period from 1993 to 1998 [74]. Malarial
parasites Plasmodium falciparum, P vivax, P ovale, and P malariae maintain
viability in red blood cells (RBC) stored at 4(C, in platelet concentrates
stored at room temperature, and following RBC cryopreservation and
thawing. Malaria is not transmitted by RBC-free components such as fresh
frozen plasma and cryoprecipitate.
The incubation period following transfusion ranges from 7 to 50 days
(average 20 days). The clinical presentation includes chills, fever, and
splenomegaly. Fatigue, nausea, vomiting, headache, and diarrhea may also
occur. Anemia may be severe, with associated hemoglobinemia and hemo-
globinuria, especially with P falciparum infection. Glucose-6-phosphate
dehydrogenase–deficient RBC are resistant to malaria. Persons lacking
Duffy RBC antigens are refractory to P vivax infection [75]. Patients with
sickle cell trait have partial resistance to P falciparum. Babesiosis (see next
section) should be considered in the differential diagnosis.
In endemic countries, where the vast majority of donors and recipients
have been previously infected, all recipients are administered inexpensive
prophylactic medication before transfusion. Prevention of transfusion-
transmitted malaria in nonendemic countries currently relies on deferral
of blood donors emigrating or returning from malaria-endemic regions,
an imperfect strategy that misses some infected donors and excludes
many noninfected people from donation. Currently available laboratory
tests are not helpful in most blood donor screening settings, as they are
impractical, insensitive, or too nonspecific. Experimental assays for
combined detection of antimalarial antibodies and antigens [76] and
a NAT-based assay [77] are under evaluation in several countries (eg,
Great Britain) with large immigrant populations from malaria-endemic
countries. Preliminary data suggest that these assays may prove useful in
the future.
Babesiosis
Babesiosis is a malaria-like zoonosis in which humans are infected
incidentally, usually through the bite of an infected tick of the genus Ixodes.
Most cases of human babesiosis in North America are caused by Babesia
microti; the pre-eminent species in Europe is B divergens. Babesia infections
are usually asymptomatic or associated with mild flu-like symptoms.
However, immunocompromised individuals are at risk for life-threatening
disease [78]. Endemic to the Northeast and upper Midwest of the United
States, the disease has more recently been recognized in eastern and western
regions of the nation as well [79,80]. More than 40 cases of transfusion-
transmitted babesiosis associated with either RBC or platelet transfusions
have been reported in the United States since 1980 [81]. Persons with
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donor screening test or other effective means of detecting asymptomatic
carriers of the parasite currently exists [67,82].
Chagas’ disease
American trypanosomiasis or Chagas’ disease, named after the Brazilian
physician Carlos Chagas who rendered the first description in 1909, consists
of a generally asymptomatic or mild, self-limiting acute illness that resolves
within 4 to 8 weeks and a chronic phase marked by cardiac disease,
megacolon, or achalasia that occurs in up to 30% to 40% of infected pa-
tients after a long latency period [83].
The causative agent is the flagellate protozoan parasite Trypanosoma
cruzi. The disorder is limited to the Western Hemisphere, where it is
widespread in Latin America from Mexico to the lower half of the South
American continent. The parasite is transmitted to humans through bites
from T cruzi–infected insects of the Reduviidae family. Efforts to eradicate
the vector have resulted in a decrease in new infections in endemic areas.
Infected persons maintain a low-level, intermittent parasitemia that usually
persists for life; treatment is only effective in eradicating the parasite when
rendered during the initial acute stage. Vector transmission is unlikely
outside endemic areas, but 50,000 to 100,000 infected Latin American
immigrants reside in the United States, and congenital transmission may
contribute to the reservoir of infected persons among immigrant commu-
nities [84]. At least six transfusion-associated cases of Chagas’ disease have
been reported in immunocompromised patients in the United States and
Canada since 1989. In all cases the implicated donors were T cruzi–infected
Latin American immigrants, and in five of the six cases platelets appeared to
be the transmitting component [85]. The low number of confirmed cases of
transfusion-transmitted Chagas’ disease in North America may be mis-
leading, because they involved fulminant disease in immunosuppressed
patients; transmissions in immunocompetent recipients with asymptomatic
or mild acute disease may be overlooked.
The prevalence of T cruzi infection among United States blood donors
varies widely. Nationwide estimates suggest a rate of 1 in 25,000 donors,
whereas communities with a large Latin American immigrant population
have three to four times higher rates [85,86]. The parasite may survive 2 to 3
weeks of cold storage and cryopreservation in blood components [71], but
the risk of transmission of T cruzi from donors residing in the United States
remains unclear. In a survey of 18 recipients who received blood from
a seropositive donor and were available for testing, none had evidence of
infection [85]. Nevertheless, transfusion-transmitted Chagas’ disease is seen
as a rising concern in the United States, and universal screening for infected
blood donations may be implemented once suitable screening and confir-
matory assays are licensed.
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screened with tests for antibodies against T cruzi antigens, demonstrates the
insufficient sensitivity and specificity of current antibody tests but suggests
that improved performance may be achieved with newer multiantigen assays
[87]. Pathogen reduction methods with psoralens [88] or other agents and, to
a lesser degree, leukocyte reduction [88,89] offer alternative approaches to
reducing transfusion transmission of the parasite. Leukocyte reduction,
which appears to be only 40% to 50% effective, has been widely adopted in
North America and Europe for reasons unrelated to its effect on trans-
mission of T cruzi. Reliable pathogen reduction methods are still essentially
limited to plasma products, with methods for treatment of platelet and red
cell components currently in clinical trials [90,91].
Classical and variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease
Classical Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) is a rare, fatal, degenerative
neurologic disease with a long asymptomatic latent period that was first
described in 1920. The causative agent of CJD is thought by most experts to
be a prion protein (PrPsc), an abnormal conformation of a normal cellular
protein (PrPc) that can induce conformational transformation (recruitment)
of additional PrPc to PrPsc, resulting in deposition of insoluble precipitates
in neural tissue and progressive dementia [92]. CJD is one of a variety of
prion diseases of humans that occur spontaneously at a rate of approxi-
mately 1 per million throughout the world and can be transmitted vertically
in familial conditions such as Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome or
horizontally through ritualistic cannibalism (kuru).
There are no reported cases of transmission of classical CJD by blood
transfusion. Nevertheless, because of the long incubation phase of the
disease (as demonstrated from growth hormone transmissions), concern
arose in the mid-1990s that CJD transmission could occur from asymp-
tomatic donors to blood transfusion recipients [93]. This theoretic risk led to
the establishment of enhanced donor deferral policies (based on iatrogenic
exposure or family history of the disease) for potential CJD carriers. Several
recent epidemiologic studies have confirmed earlier studies in failing to
establish a link between transfusion and transmission of CJD [93]. Although
it is still regarded as a theoretic risk, there is an emerging consensus that
classical CJD is not transmitted by transfusion.
Like classical CJD, variant (v) CJD is a fatal, degenerative neurologic
disease, although it occurs in younger persons and has distinctive clinical,
histopathologic, and biochemical features, including the presence of readily
detectable prion protein in non–central nervous system lymphoreticular
tissues such as appendix, spleen, tonsil, and lymph nodes. In contrast to
classical CJD, vCJD disease is new, first reported in the United Kingdom in
1996 [94]. Over the first several years of investigation, it was proved that the
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causes bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). A massive epidemic of
BSE occurred in Great Britain in the 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the
recycling and processing of material (offal) from dead sheep and cattle into
food meal for cattle. Although this practice was stopped in the mid-1990s
following appreciation of the BSE epidemic, an estimated 250,000 cattle had
already been infected with BSE. Transmission of the BSE prions to humans
occurred by oral consumption of beef and other cattle products containing
reticular endothelial or neural tissue, resulting in a delayed outbreak of
vCJD in the United Kingdom (Fig. 4).
Several observations raised the theoretic concern that vCJD could be
spread by blood transfusion. These included (1) the unknown but
Fig. 4. Numbers of confirmed cases of BSE (top) vis-a`-vis numbers of clinical cases of vCJD
(bottom) from 1986–2003 in Great Britain. The epidemic of BSE in Britain peaked in 1992,
4 years after the introduction of the ban on feeding tissues of one ruminant animal to other
ruminant animals. First cases of the associated human disease, vCJD, appeared several years
after the onset of the BSE epidemic. The incidence of vCJD cases appears to be leveling off after
reaching a maximum in 2000, and it can be hoped that they will follow the same trend as BSE
cases in Britain. If so, the concern about transfusion-transmitted vCJD should decline as well.
(From Donnelly CA. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States—an epidemio-
logist’s view. N Engl J Med 2004;350(6):540; with permission.)
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Kingdom and other countries with significant imports of United Kingdom
beef products; (2) the possibility of a very long incubation period such as has
been observed with other transmissible spongiform encephalopathies; (3) the
detection of the vCJD prion protein in lymphoid and other reticuloendo-
thelial cells (dendritic cells); (4) the biologic differences between the prions
and pathogenesis of vCJD and classical CJD, which make it unreasonable to
extrapolate epidemiologic data about the lack of transfusion transmission of
classical CJD to vCJD, and (5) studies on rodent and primate animal models
that demonstrated infectivity in blood and implicated transfusion as
a possible mode of transmission [95].
Based on the theoretic concern that vCJD could be transmitted by blood
transfusion and the initial finding that all known cases of vCJD could be
traced to time spent in the United Kingdom, a policy was adopted in 1999 of
indefinite deferral of persons who spent more than 6 months in the United
Kingdom from 1980 to 1996 [96]. This measure was predicted to reduce the
number of donors potentially infected with vCJD by approximately 70%
and to result in the deferral of approximately 2.5% of otherwise eligible
donors. Following discovery of vCJD cases in continental Europe, the
deferral policy was revised to include donors who had spent more than
3 months in the United Kingdom or 5 years in Europe since 1980 [96].
As of April 2004, 146 definite or probable cases of vCJD have been
reported in the United Kingdom [97], with an additional six cases
originating in France and one in Italy. Four additional reported cases have
occurred elsewhere (one each in Canada, the United States [98], Hong
Kong, and Ireland) but were likely acquired in the United Kingdom. There
have been no significant changes in vCJD epidemiology besides the fact that
the potential rate increase of vCJD in the United Kingdom that had been
predicted by early worst-case models did not occur.
The possibility that vCJD may be transmitted by transfusion received
fresh attention after the recent report of the disease in a transfusion recipient
who had received one red cell component from a blood donor who died of
vCJD 3 years after the donation [99]. The implicated donor was one of 15
identified in late 2003 from a total of then 145 vCJD cases on Britain’s
national CJD surveillance unit register. The recipient became ill 6 years after
the transfusion and died of vCJD 13 months from onset of symptoms. The
diagnosis was confirmed by examination of brain tissue. While statistical
analysis suggests it is unlikely that the recipient acquired vCJD unrelated to
the transfusion, this possibility cannot be ruled out entirely, and definitive
proof of vCJD transmission through blood products in humans is still
lacking.
In estimating the risk of transmissibility of vCJD by transfusion, it
should be emphasized that the aforementioned report is so far the only one
that suggests a direct link. To date, none of the other 47 recipients of blood
components donated by the 15 individuals with vCJD in the United
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provided blood for four transfusion recipients who were later diagnosed
with vCJD are all in good health [99]. It also is encouraging to see that the
eventual total number of vCJD cases is declining, with recent reports
projecting a range of 205 to several thousand total cases. However, such
estimates are critically dependent on the nonquantifiable assumptions that
underlie them [100].
Summary
Despite the recent dramatic decline in the risk posed by TTVs, particularly
HIV and HCV, concerns remain about contamination of the blood supply
with novel and emerging viruses, bacteria, parasites, and infectious proteins
(prions). Immediate improvement in blood safety can be expected from the
adoption of more effective methods to prevent bacteria from entering blood
donations and from mandatory implementation of bacterial detection
systems. The overall threat from novel and emerging pathogens will be
more difficult to address, because multiple agents are involved and the risks
of transmission by transfusion and adverse outcomes in recipients are
generally not well defined. Discussions about appropriate measures to
protect the blood supply from agents like SARS, vCJD, and West Nile virus
are ongoing, illustrating the challenge of finding the right balance between
the desire and mandate for safety and the need to maintain an adequate and
affordable blood supply. Past experience has shown, for example, that
closure of the infectious window periods through implementation of new
molecular assays can result in significantly enhanced safety, but at a very high
cost. Whereas serologic screening of donors for HBV, HIV, and HCV was
essentially cost-neutral (ie, the cost of testing was offset by the savings in
prevented infections/disease), the costs for NAT testing exceed $1 million per
infection prevented or per quality-adjusted life year saved [101]. Pathogen-
reduction methods currently under development promise effective protection
from most TTVs and other pathogenic organisms (with the exception of
prions), but these methods could nearly double the cost of platelet and RBC
components and are likely to raise new safety concerns when they are moved
from the trial stage to clinical practice [90,91,102].
Besides measures that are aimed directly at keeping pathogens from
entering the blood supply, such as adoption of more restrictive donor
acceptance criteria, expanded blood donation screening, and pathogen
reduction methods, better knowledge and understanding of established and
potential infectious risks are a prerequisite for a rational protective strategy.
Essential tools are surveillance studies capable of analyzing large blood
donor populations for emerging pathogens [103] and national programs that
provide the resources and infrastructures needed to monitor blood safety
and rapidly assess whether and to what extent a pathogen is transmitted by
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conducted on a global scale. Outbreaks of new viral diseases often start in
developing nations but, by means of international commerce and travel, can
spread to any region of the world overnight. Proactive surveillance through
collaboration with blood collection programs in developing countries is
a critical barrier to such an event, as are efforts to assist local agencies with
the establishment of sustainable blood collection, processing, and trans-
fusion systems [73,107]. These measures will both protect recipients who
require transfusions in developing countries and, in the long run, enhance
transfusion safety in high-income nations.
Assistance in the surveillance effort can be expected from technological
advances such as multiplexed nucleic acid testing systems [108], microarray-
based detection and genotyping systems for virus discovery and identifica-
tion (‘‘viral gene chips’’) [109,110], and integrated, automated surveillance
systems for detecting viruses and other infectious agents in human blood
[111]. Given the number, variety, and flexibility of biologic systems, it is safe
to predict that we will continue to encounter new and changing infectious
agents that will need to be assessed as potential threats to transfusion
recipients and prevented from entering the blood supply.
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